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Quasi -property interests refer to situations in which the law seeks to simu-
late the idea of exclusion, normally associated with property rights, through a 
relational liability regime, by focusing on the nature and circumstances of the 
interaction in question, which is thought to merit a highly circumscribed form of 
exclusion.  In this Article, I unpack the analytical and normative bases of quasi -
property interests, examine the primary triggering events that cause courts to 
invoke the category, and respond to potential objections to the recognition of 
quasi -property as an independent category of interests in the law. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Tort, contract, and property have long been taken to be the foun-
dational categories of the common law.1  Very roughly speaking, tort 
law deals with the breach of obligations imposed by law, contract law 
with the creation and breach of voluntary obligations, and property 
law with the rights and duties that relate to “things.”  To this threefold 
classification, courts and scholars have added two more hybrid cate-
gories:  quasi-contract and quasi-tort.2  The law of quasi-contract deals 
with situations where the law implies the existence of contract-like 
obligations based on a party’s actions, and the law of quasi-tort (or 
quasi-delict) refers to the law’s recognition of an obligation on the part 
of one party to compensate another for reasons resembling actionable 
wrongdoing.3 
So if the law of quasi-contracts deals with contract-like situations 
that aren’t strictly contractual, and the law of quasi-torts with tort-like 
scenarios that aren’t purely delictual, does a more prominent category 
of situations exist where the law creates property-like entitlements, 
but recognizes them to be something other than truly proprietary in 
 
1 See generally PETER BIRKS, UNJUST ENRICHMENT 20-32 (2d ed. 2005). 
2 The origins of these categories are often traced back to the Roman jurist Justinian.  
See Peter Birks, Definition and Division:  A Meditation on Institutes 3.13, in THE CLASSIFI-
CATION OF OBLIGATIONS 6 (Peter Birks ed., 1997). 
3 For work on the category of quasi-contract, see generally WILLIAM A. KEENER, A 
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF QUASI-CONTRACTS (New York, Baker, Voorhis & Co. 1893) 
(five volumes); Arthur Linton Corbin, Quasi-Contractual Obligations, 21 YALE L.J. 533 
(1912); William A. Keener, Quasi-Contract, Its Nature and Scope, 7 HARV. L. REV. 57 
(1893); Joseph L. Lewinsohn, Contract Distinguished from Quasi Contract, 2 CALIF. L. REV. 
171 (1914); and Max Radin, The Roman Law of Quasi-Contract, 23 VA. L. REV. 241 (1937).  
Scholarship on the idea of quasi-delict, which is much rarer, includes Nathan Isaacs, 
Quasi-Delict in Anglo-American Law, 31 YALE L.J. 571 (1922), and Olivia Robinson, Justin-
ian’s Institutional Classification and the Class of Quasi-Delict, 19 J. LEGAL HIST. 245 (1998). 
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character?  Could it be that the idea of property is sufficiently loose and 
open-ended so as to accommodate all property-like situations?  In this 
Article, I argue that there is indeed a coherent category of property-
like interests best defined by the term “quasi-property.”  This category 
consists of situations where the law attempts to simulate the functioning of 
property’s exclusionary apparatus through a relational liability regime. 
The idea of “quasi-property” is today commonly associated with the 
Supreme Court’s decision in International News Service v. Associated Press,4 
a decision credited with developing the common law doctrine of in-
formation misappropriation.5  Speaking for the majority, Justice Pitney 
recognized the right of an information gatherer to prevent a competitor 
from free riding on the original gatherer’s labor for a limited period 
of time.6  What distinguished the interest recognized by the Court from 
property, however, was that it would only ever exist between the two 
parties in question and never in the abstract against the world at large.7  
Justice Pitney therefore used the term “quasi property” to describe the 
entitlement.8  In the years since the opinion, hardly anyone has at-
tached any significance to Justice Pitney’s use of the term to describe 
this peculiar bilateral interest in exclusivity.9 
Justice Pitney’s use of the term “quasi property” was, however, very 
deliberate.  Beginning in the nineteenth century, common law courts 
came to characterize some interests that sought to mimic the function-
ing of property solely as a mechanism of liability, as quasi-property in 
nature.  Rather prominent among these was a person’s right to control 
the corpse of a dead relative—known as the right of “sepulcher”—
interferences with which were rendered actionable.10  In both the 
sepulchral rights and International News Service contexts, the law’s 
choice of quasi-property instead of property was both conscious and 
analytically significant. 
 
4 248 U.S. 215 (1918). 
5 See, e.g., Newman v. Sathyavaglswaran, 287 F.3d 786, 797 n.13 (9th Cir. 2002) 
(attributing the term “quasi-property” to International News Service); 2 RUDOLF CALL-
MANN, THE LAW OF UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS AND MONOPOLIES § 15.02 (4th 
ed. 1986) (“The landmark case in this field, the INS case . . . is one of the most im-
portant cases, if not the most important, in the law of unfair competition.”). 
6 See Int’l News Serv., 248 U.S. at 238. 
7 Id. at 236. 
8 Id. 
9 See, e.g., Newman, 287 F.3d at 797 & n.13 (describing quasi-property as “a term with 
little meaningful legal significance”). 
10 See infra text accompanying notes 24-36. 
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A property right has long been thought to center around the idea 
of exclusion, and is often described as entailing the “right to exclude.”11  
The right to exclude is in turn believed to operate in rem (i.e., against 
the world at large).12  The interest that the Court created in International 
News Service, however, was consciously tailored to avoid being in rem.13  
Neither was it in personam (i.e., against a specified party, a character-
istic commonly associated with contractual rights).  Rather, the right 
was to operate against a specified class of actors, and only ever upon the 
occurrence of a specific triggering event.14  Through the use of a tailored 
liability framework, the law sought to replicate the functioning of prop-
erty rights as exclusionary entitlements.  A resource would thus become 
owned only within this highly contextual setting, while independent of 
it, the resource remained unowned, thereby endowing it with a distinc-
tively chameleonic character.  The entitlement that the Court created 
was therefore entirely relational and marked a major departure from 
the in rem idea commonly associated with traditional property. 
Quasi-property interests thus involve the use of a relational entitle-
ment mechanism to simulate property’s exclusionary framework within 
limited settings.  As a category, its significance is more functional than 
just taxonomical.  A relational entitlement to exclude has a fundamen-
tally different signaling effect from an equivalent entitlement created 
by the traditional right to exclude commonly associated with property.  
The distinction maps onto (but remains distinct from) the difference 
between simple and relational legal directives used to distinguish be-
tween the functioning of the tort and criminal law systems.  Whereas 
criminal law communicates direct (and therefore simple) legal com-
mands in the nature of “X act is prohibited” or “every X act will result in 
 
11 See, e.g., J.E. PENNER, THE IDEA OF PROPERTY IN LAW 71 (1997) (contending that 
“use serves a justificatory role for the [property] right, while exclusion is . . . the formal 
essence of the right”); Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Demystifying the Right to Exclude:  Of 
Property, Inviolability, and Automatic Injunctions, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 593, 596-600 
(2008) (noting the centrality of the right to exclude but explaining that the “right and 
remedy” have been unlinked, with consequences for “intellectual property and property 
more generally”); Thomas W. Merrill, Property and the Right to Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REV. 
730, 730 (1998) (arguing that the right to exclude is not simply an essential aspect of 
property; rather, “it is the sine qua non”). 
12 Balganesh, supra note 11, at 602-03, 611-12. 
13 See Int’l News Serv., 248 U.S. at 236 (“[W]e may and do assume that neither party 
has any remaining property interest as against the public in uncopyrighted news matter 
after the moment of its first publication . . . .”). 
14 See id. at 236, 241 (explaining that the “quasi property” right in the news “does 
not result in . . . the right to monopolize either the gathering or the distribution of the 
news”). 
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Y punishment,” a liability framework (such as tort or unjust enrich-
ment) merely specifies what individuals in a particular relationship to 
each other are meant to do or not do.15  These communications are 
thus of the form “A should/should not perform X act on B,” where A 
and B are specified by class or context.  Translated into the property 
context, traditional property rights communicate a simple directive to 
the world at large that relates to an identified resource (i.e., the res).  
Property scholars have described this signaling as the directives of 
“abstention,” “forbearance,” or “inviolability.”  They signal to the 
world:  stay away—this resource is owned.16 
A quasi-property right, by contrast, doesn’t communicate the same 
message.  Instead, its directive operates in much the same way as those 
of tort law—i.e., it merely signals to one party to stay away from an ac-
tual or fictional resource only when the two parties stand in a particular 
relationship to each other, which is in turn activated by certain trigger-
ing facts.  These triggering facts may be the parties’ statuses vis-à-vis 
each other, the specific actions that one or both of them undertake, 
the peculiarities of the context within which the parties interact over 
the resource, or some combination of the three.  Until one party 
comes to be identified as standing in a particular relationship towards 
the other (as recognized by the directive), no signal of exclusion is 
communicated.  This triggering is crucial and is indeed one of the 
most unique features of a quasi-property interest.  As a direct result of 
the emphasis on the parties’ relationship, an exclusionary signal never 
attaches to the resource itself in the abstract; instead, this signal is 
mediated through the relationship. 
This Article does three things.  First, it unbundles the analytical 
framework underlying the concept of quasi-property by focusing on how 
quasi-property interests differ from traditional property rights.  Second, 
it shows why, in some situations, the law might choose to characterize 
some interests as quasi-property rather than as property, and in the 
process attempts to identify the law’s principal motivations for choos-
ing one over the other.  Third, it shows that the set of quasi-property 
 
15 For a fuller treatment of this idea, see Benjamin C.  Zipursky, Rights, Wrongs, and 
Recourse in the Law of Torts, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1, 88-93 (1998). 
16 See, e.g., PENNER, supra note 11, at 71-72 (describing the exclusionary thesis); 
Balganesh, supra note 11, at 619; Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The  
Property/Contract Interface, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 773, 789-90 (2001).  Indeed, the exclu-
sionary principle can be traced as far back as Kant’s concept of property.  See ARTHUR 
RIPSTEIN, FORCE AND FREEDOM:  KANT’S LEGAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 90 (2009). 
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interests in the law might in reality be much more expansive than is 
currently believed. 
The normative theme underlying much of this Article is that, while 
the idea of property in law has at once expanded as a category and at 
the same time come to be endowed with ideological significance, its 
core architectural framework as a legal institution has fallen into ne-
glect in most contexts.17  The costs of this neglect are more than just 
academic, since the concept of property exerts a huge influence on 
people’s perceptions and incentives in different settings.  Identifying a 
set of entitlements that are “like, but not quite” property—quasi-
property—will go some distance in maintaining the conceptual and 
analytical integrity of property as a normatively important institution 
under the law. 
The Article unfolds in three main parts.  Part I sets out the idea of 
quasi-property by focusing on the signaling effects of exclusionary in-
terests created through relational liability regimes.  In the process, it 
endeavors to show that there is indeed a common underlying frame-
work that connects these seemingly disparate interests characterized as 
quasi-property, and that this framework derives from the fundamentally 
different way in which these interests operationalize the idea of exclu-
sion.  Part II builds on the structural framework of the previous Part by 
exploring possible reasons why the law might choose to regulate a par-
ticular resource or interaction through a quasi-property framework 
rather than a traditional property- or tort-based one.  Finally, Part III 
considers and responds to a few possible objections to the recognition 
of quasi-property as an analytically coherent category of interests in 
the law. 
I.  THE IDEA OF QUASI-PROPERTY INTERESTS 
The term “quasi-property” is today commonly associated with the 
Supreme Court’s now-infamous opinion in International News Service v. 
Associated Press.18  There, the Court refused to recognize a full- 
blown property right in news and instead chose to create an unfair 
 
17 For an early identification of this phenomenon, see Thomas C. Grey, The Disinte-
gration of Property, in PROPERTY 69, 69-73 (J . Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 
Nomos XXII, 1980); for the argument that ever since Coase, property has come to be 
conceptualized less like a “distinctive in rem right” and more like a “list of use rights in 
particular resources,” see also Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, What Happened to 
Property in Law and Economics?, 111 YALE L.J. 357, 359-60, 366-75 (2001).   
18 248 U.S. 215. 
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competition–based action of “misappropriation,” which would func-
tion as a quasi-property interest in the news.19  International News Service 
was, however, a case in equity.20  And, as I shall discuss below, equity’s 
use of the term “quasi-property” to describe certain kinds of interests 
predates the misappropriation doctrine by at least half a century. 
Equity courts began using the term “quasi-property” to describe in-
terests that resembled property rights in their functioning even when 
they weren’t property rights, or, strictly speaking, ownership interests.  
A “lien” on another’s property,21 an owner’s right to any improvements 
made to his realty,22 or a mere beneficial interest in a property were 
frequently termed by courts as interests that were quasi -property.23 
The earliest systematic usage of the term arose a few years later in 
relation to corpses.  The rights and obligations of sepulcher refer to 
the entitlements and liabilities associated with the burial of a corpse.24  
Very early in its development, English common law came to adopt the 
position that there was no property right or ownership interest what-
soever in a corpse.25  This rule emanated from the rather strict division 
between the courts of common law and the ecclesiastic courts:  pursuant 
to this division, the former were allowed to develop any rules necessary 
to ensure the proper burial of corpses in accordance with any required 
 
19 Id. at 236. 
20 Id. at 240. 
21 See, e.g., Hunter v. Blanchard, 18 Ill. 318, 324 (1857) (construing a statutory lien 
as giving the furnishers of building materials “a quasi property in those materials, and 
others with which it has been commingled in the building”); Gove v. Cather, 23 Ill. 634 
(1860). 
22 See, e.g., Horner v. Pleasants, 7 A. 691, 692 (Md. 1887); Balt. & Ohio R.R. v. 
Chase, 43 Md. 23, 35-36 (1875); Casey’s Lessee v. Inloes, 1 Gill 430, 501 (Md. 1844). 
23 See, e.g., Woodruff v. United States, 7 Ct. Cl. 605, 626 (1871) (“They had . . . an 
interest in the cotton itself, the jus in re, which is quasi property; and the United States 
held the cotton charged with that obligation of specific performance to which it was 
subject when seized.”), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. The Elgee Cotton Cases, 89 U.S. 
180 (1874). 
24 For earlier works on the property law related to burial remains, see generally 
Tanya K. Hernández, The Property of Death, 60 U. PITT. L. REV. 971, 971-72 (1999), and 
P.D.G. Skegg, Human Corpses, Medical Specimens, and the Law of Property, 4 ANGLO-AM. L. 
REV. 412, 412 (1975).  See also Pierce v. Proprietors of Swan Point Cemetery, 10 R.I. 227, 
235-44 (1872). 
25 See Hernández, supra note 24, at 982 (“[E]arly English common law did not rec-
ognize property interest in a dead body . . . .”); Skegg, supra note 24, at 412 (“It is gen-
erally accepted that in English law the corpse of a human being is not the subject of 
property, even though the person who is under the duty to dispose of it has a right to 
possession for that purpose.”). 
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religious practices.26  Edward Coke thus famously declared that under 
the common law, corpses were “nullius in bonis” (i.e., no one’s prop-
erty).27 
As the common law crossed the Atlantic, however, this jurisdic-
tional division presented a problem:  the absence in America of a strict 
separation between the common law and ecclesiastical law—
ecclesiastical courts did not exist in America—meant that the common 
law could no longer simply avoid the subject along the lines suggested 
by Coke.28  American courts were understandably reluctant to follow 
the English rule.29  To such courts, corpses seemed deserving of some 
protection against mutilation in order to protect the emotional inter-
ests of the family and the next of kin; ironically, though, that very rea-
son also militated in favor of not treating corpses as ordinary ownable 
resources.30  Courts in a number of states thus adopted a middle posi-
tion by applying the category of quasi-property to the interest.31  As 
one early court, in identifying this conflict, observed, 
 
26 See Hernández, supra note 24, at 993; BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 407-08 (9th ed. 
2009). 
27 EDWARD COKE, THE THIRD PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND; 
CONCERNING HIGH TREASON, AND OTHER PLEAS OF THE CROWN AND CRIMINAL CAUSES 
203 (London, W. Clarke & Sons 1817). 
28 See Hernández, supra note 24, at 993. 
29 See, e.g., Renihan v. Wright, 25 N.E. 822, 823-25 (Ind. 1890) (arguing that be-
cause of the “ecclesiastical element” inherent in England’s jurisprudence but “not 
found in our[s],” England’s law should not “exert any controlling influence”); Pierce, 10 
R.I. at 237 (noting that while “[t]he question is new in this state . . . there is no right of 
property in a dead body”). 
30 See PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 12, at 63 (W. Page Keeton et 
al. eds., 5th ed. 1984) (“[T]he courts have talked of a somewhat dubious ‘property 
right’ to the body, usually in the next of kin, which . . . cannot be conveyed, can be 
used only for the one purpose of burial, and not only has no pecuniary value but is a 
source of liability for funeral expenses.” (footnotes omitted)); Hernández, supra note 
24, at 1026 (discussing the law’s need to balance the interests of the decedent and his 
family). 
31 For example, under Arkansas law, “the next of kin [has] a quasi-property right in 
a dead body.”  Fuller v. Marx, 724 F.2d 717, 719 (8th Cir. 1984).  For examples of state 
court cases identifying a quasi-property interest, see Cohen v. Groman Mortuary, Inc., 
41 Cal. Rptr. 481, 483 (Dist. Ct. App. 1964); O’Donnell v. Slack, 55 P. 906, 907 (Cal. 
1899); Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Wilson, 51 S.E. 24, 27 (Ga. 1905); Burney v. 
Children’s Hosp. in Bos., 47 N.E. 401, 402 (Mass. 1897); Brown v. Maplewood Ceme-
tery Ass’n, 89 N.W. 872, 879 (Minn. 1902); In re Donn, 14 N.Y.S. 189, 191 (Sup. Ct. 
1891); Long v. Chi. Rock Island & Pac. Ry. Co., 86 P. 289, 290-91 (Okla. 1905); Hackett 
v. Hackett, 26 A. 42, 43-44 (R.I. 1893); Pierce, 10. R.I. at 238; and Griffith v. Charlotte, 
Columbia & August R.R., 23 S.C. 25, 41 (1885). 
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[T]he burial of the dead is a subject which interests the feelings of man-
kind to a much greater degree than many matters of actual property.  
There is a duty imposed by the universal feelings of mankind to be dis-
charged by some one towards the dead; a duty, and we may also say a right, 
to protect from violation; and a duty on the part of others to abstain from 
violation; it may therefore be considered as a sort of quasi property . . . .
32 
Quasi-property thus emerged as the American common law term 
for the possessory or custodial interest that members of a deceased’s 
family had over the deceased’s mortal remains for purposes of disposal.  
The use of the term, and the development of a liability regime, were 
motivated by the impetus to protect the “personal feelings” or “senti-
ment and propriety” of the next of kin in having the corpse buried.33  
Prosser thus described this idea of a property-like right in the body to 
be a mere “fiction likely to deceive no one but a lawyer.”34  Nonetheless, 
the fiction had real functional significance, since it enabled relatives to 
recover damages upon commercial and noncommercial interferences, 
and located the middle-level principle motivating this right in the idea 
of possessing the corpse.  In keeping with the limited purpose that the 
interest served, the law came to forbid the conveyance of this quasi-
property interest and recognized it to be of no independent pecuniary 
significance.35  Additionally, some jurisdictions also came to require 
that the plaintiff establish some kind of “mental anguish” or a proxy 
therefor before finding liability for the interference.36  Justice Pitney’s 
use of quasi-property in International News Service was thus more than 
just a play on words. 
A second area in which courts have come to use the idea of quasi-
property in recent times is trademark law and the doctrine of trade-
mark dilution.37  Unlike traditional trademark infringement, which is 
 
32 Pierce, 10 R.I. at 237-38; accord Donn, 14 N.Y.S. at 191 (“It is the almost universal 
practice among civilized people to scrupulously conform to the wishes and requests of 
friends and relatives as to the disposition to be made of their bodies.”). 
33 Hackett, 26 A. at 43. 
34 PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS, supra note 30, § 12, at 63. 
35 See, e.g., Donn, 14 N.Y.S. at 191; Long, 86 P. at 292 (“[E]quity will always aid one in 
the enjoyment of a legal right, even though no property interests are involved.”). 
36 See, e.g., Galvin v. McGilley Mem’l Chapels, 746 S.W.2d 588, 591 (Mo. Ct. App. 
1987) (“The gist of the cause of action, as presently evolved, is the emotional distress 
and anguish to the nearest kin from mistreatment of the body.”). 
37 See, e.g., Autozone, Inc. v. Tandy Corp., 373 F.3d 786, 801 (6th Cir. 2004) (“Dilu-
tion law, unlike traditional trademark infringement law . . . is not based on a likelihood 
of confusion standard, but only exists to protect the quasi-property rights a [trade-
mark] holder has in maintaining the integrity and distinctiveness of his mark.” (quot-
ing Kellogg Co. v. Toucan Golf, Inc., 337 F.3d 616, 628 (6th Cir. 2003))); Ringling 
Balganesh Revised Final.doc (DO NOT DELETE) 6/7/2012 7:55 AM 
1898 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 160: 1889 
 
predicated on a showing of consumer confusion, trademark dilution is 
an action that seeks to protect the “capacity of a famous [trade]mark to 
identify and distinguish goods or services”38 as a quasi-property interest 
that is actionable independent of consumer confusion.39  Treated as a 
quasi-property interest, reputation is protected through a heavily cir-
cumscribed exclusionary framework that is tailored to the centrality of 
perception, which forms the source of its protection-worthy attribute.  
The quasi-property framework allows trademark to retain its roots in 
the ideas of deceit and unfair competition without abandoning the 
idea of exclusionary protection altogether.40 
While the rights regimes that the common law came to create in the 
news, corpses, and the reputation of a trademark may at first seem com-
pletely unrelated, they in fact exhibit important structural similarities.  
First, in all three contexts the law consciously avoids the recognition or 
creation of an ordinary property right in the subject matter involved.  
While the law’s reasons for this avoidance are different, avoidance of a 
property interest was nonetheless crucial to the development of all three 
regimes.  Second, despite its avoidance of creating a traditional prop-
erty right in rem, the law nonetheless evinces the belief that there is 
some value in the idea of imposing a limited duty of forbearance.  
Third, this duty is heavily circumscribed by considerations that ema-
nate directly from the parties’ actions, interactions, and statuses, and 
only indirectly relate to the subject-matter in question.  Finally, the law 
deems it appropriate (or necessary) to impose liability on actors that 
 
Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. of Travel Dev., 955 F. Supp. 
605, 613 n.7 (E.D. Va. 1997) (“A federal dilution claim . . . shifts the focus away from 
consumer protection and towards the protection of an owner’s quasi-property right in a 
famous mark, itself.”). 
38 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2000) (defining “dilution”), amended by Trademark Dilution 
Revision Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-312, § 2, 120 Stat. 1730, 1730-33 (striking defini-
tion of “dilution” from 15 U.S.C. § 1127 and fleshing out dilution law in § 1125). 
39 See Kellogg, 337 F.3d at 628 (laying out the five-part test for trademark dilution 
under the Federal Trademark Dilution Act); see also 4 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY 
ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 24:70 (4th ed. 2009) (“Dilution . . . might 
occur where the effect of the defendant’s unauthorized use is to dilute by tarnishing or 
degrading positive associations of the mark and thus, to harm the reputation of the 
mark.”). 
40 See Kathleen B. McCabe, Note, Dilution-by-Blurring:  A Theory Caught in the Shadow 
of Trademark Infringement, 68 FORDHAM L.  REV. 1827, 1835 (2000) (“[T]rademark law is 
instead viewed as . . . developing from the notion of unfair competition . . . [which] in 
turn evolved from the commercial tort of fraud and deceit.  Hence, . . . courts . . . use 
elements of both the tort of deceit and trespass, . . . which results in quasi-property 
protections.” (footnotes omitted)). 
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breach this duty in different ways.  While this fourth point is unexcep-
tional, the second and third points are crucial to the idea of quasi-
property.  The first, regarding avoidance, is the subject of the next 
Part. 
Central to the idea of property is exclusion.41  Classifying an interest 
in an object as a “property right” thus entails endowing it with (i) an 
exclusionary significance (ii) that is largely objective, in the sense of 
being insensitive to time, place, and context.  An interest is endowed 
with exclusionary significance when a norm of inviolability (i.e., the 
duty of forbearance) is associated with the object that the interest 
relates to.42  This inviolability may originate either in a social norm 
(more likely for traditional tangible resources such as land and chattel)43 
or entirely in a legal directive (more likely for intangibles like patents).44  
Yet regardless of its source, the norm operates by identifying the 
boundaries of the object and imposing a duty of forbearance (or exclu-
sion) on everyone—the indeterminate set of individuals—other than 
the owner.45  The insensitivity to context is an attribute of property’s 
status as an in rem right, which operates against the world at large 
(i.e., against strangers to the right-holder, and independent of any 
causal relationship between the parties).46 
A quasi-property interest works by relaxing both of these features 
of traditional property rights.  It deemphasizes the connection between 
the interest and the resource; as a result, the resource comes to be 
devoid of objective exclusionary significance.  Yet because exclusion 
remains a crucial feature, quasi-property must still allude to property as 
an idea.  Instead, the law generates the exclusionary framework through 
the creation of a liability regime that focuses on a different set of in-
terests that are implicated in the parties’ interactions.  These interests 
 
41 See, e.g., Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 
U.S. 666, 673 (1999) (“The hallmark of a protected property interest is the right to 
exclude others.”); Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979) (describing 
“the right to exclude others” as “one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights 
that are commonly characterized as property”); Merrill, supra note 11, at 752 (“[T]he 
right to exclude is the sine qua non of property.”). 
42 For a more in-depth analysis of the norm of inviolability and the right to exclude, 
see Balganesh, supra note 11, at 625-29. 
43 See id. at 624 (“The precise strength of the norm tends to vary across resource 
and context. . . . Much of the variation depends on social custom.”). 
44 See id. at 628-29. 
45 Id. at 625-29. 
46 For the leading account unbundling the idea of the right in rem, see Albert 
Kocourek, Rights in Rem, 68 U. PA. L. REV. 322 (1920). 
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in turn relate to, but do not emanate exclusively from, the resource.  
They derive instead from the nature, context, and consequences of the 
parties’ interactions—much like the laws of tort and unjust enrich-
ment—and less from the connection between the resource and the 
right-holder.  As a result, the exclusionary significance of the right is 
targeted only at a determinate set of actors. 
This heightened determinacy certainly does not imply that the 
quasi-property interest is purely ad hoc; in the abstract, the interest 
preexists the identification of a defendant.  But until the defendant 
enters the picture and is identified (by relationship, action, or harm), 
the plaintiff’s interest is practically inconsequential; unlike traditional 
property rights that are meaningful even prior to their infraction, it is 
latent at best.  Quasi-property interests thus hang “in the air,” to bor-
row then–Chief Judge Cardozo’s analogous description of negligence 
law, unless or until a defendant is identified.47   
Returning to our examples of quasi-property reveals how this com-
mon framework functions.  In International News Service, the Court  
created a liability framework that would allow one newsgatherer to  
exclude another from the time-sensitive news that the former collected, 
but only when they were both direct competitors in the same market.48  The 
parties’ relative statuses—here, as direct competitors—triggered the 
quasi-property exclusionary framework.  Exclusion thus relates to the 
time-sensitive news (its subject matter), but hardly emanates from it, 
since without the parties’ statuses vis-à-vis each other, news has little 
objective exclusionary significance.  The exclusion is thus highly sensi-
tive to the peculiarities of the context.  So too it is with the rights of 
sepulcher discussed earlier.  A person is allowed to exclude another 
from the corpse of a relative, but only when that person is likely to suf-
fer mental anguish as a result of the latter’s actions.  Here, the exclu-
sionary framework is triggered by both the plaintiff’s status in relation 
to the deceased and the nature of the defendant’s actions. 
What we thus see happening in these quasi-property settings is that 
the exclusionary signal, commonly associated with a property interest, 
isn’t fully mediated through the res.  Property scholars have long iden-
tified the creation of a jural relationship mediated through the  
 
47 Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 162 N.E. 99, 99 (N.Y. 1928) (quoting FREDERICK 
POLLOCK, THE LAW OF TORTS:  A TREATISE ON THE PRINCIPLES OF OBLIGATIONS ARISING 
FROM CIVIL WRONGS IN THE COMMON LAW 455 (11th ed. 1920)). 
48 See Int’l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 235-36 (1918). 
Balganesh Revised Final.doc (DO NOT DELETE)  6/7/2012 7:55 AM 
2012] Quasi-Property 1901 
 
resource as a characteristic feature of the law of property rights.49  This 
mediation is thus thought to enable the true in rem nature of the 
right, since it allows for both owner and interferer to remain indifferent 
to each other’s identity and characteristics.50  In the quasi-property con-
text, however, the law communicates its exclusionary signal inde-
pendent of the resource—even though it relates the signal to the 
resource.  Indeed, the exclusionary signal emanates from the relation-
ship between the parties in question:  their statuses vis-à-vis each other, 
their interaction, or the particular context within which they interact.  
Only when this relational dimension is implicated does the resource 
come to be endowed with the limited exclusionary significance that 
resembles the functioning of property.  The description above thus 
implicates two interrelated analytical elements for quasi-property in-
terests:  a trigger for the exclusionary signal, and its communication as a 
signal to actors. 
A.  Triggering Exclusion 
One characteristic feature of quasi-property interests is that they 
endow a resource with exclusionary significance only within certain 
narrow domains that are in turn triggered by certain circumstances.  
Until and unless these circumstances arise, the resource in question 
remains nullius in bonis (i.e., unowned).  The additional significance of 
these triggers is that they can in some sense be turned “off.”  Thus, 
when the factual circumstances that affirmatively endow the resource 
with exclusionary significance disappear, the exclusionary significance 
itself also ceases to exist.  This off switch is particularly important be-
cause, as we will see below, it influences the nature and functioning of 
the legal directive involved.   
Nearly eight decades ago, noted theorist and legal realist Leon 
Green published a series of articles under the title “Relational  
Interests,”51 wherein he voiced exasperation that courts tended to 
 
49 See, e.g., PENNER, supra note 11, at 29 (“The criterion is whether the duty is in any 
way specific to particular individuals in terms of its content.”); Merrill & Smith, supra 
note 17, at 364 (“[I]n rem property rights . . . attach to persons insofar as they have a 
certain relationship to some thing.”). 
50 See PENNER, supra note 11, at 30 (“Norms in rem establish the general, impersonal 
practices upon which modern societies largely depend.  They allow strangers to interact 
with each other in a rule-governed way, though their dealings are not personal in any 
significant respect.”). 
51 For the series of articles, see Leon Green, Relational Interests, 29 ILL. L. REV. 460 
(1934) [hereinafter Green, Relational Interests (pt. 1)]; Leon Green, Relational Interests, 
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characterize certain interests as forms of property with the sole objec-
tive of invoking and applying equitable considerations.52  He instead 
proposed treating these interests as a distinct category of interests that 
were not in any sense connected to a “tangible thing,” but instead fo-
cused on protecting a relationship that the plaintiff had to another 
individual or society.53  Green’s basic intuition was in some sense cor-
rect:  courts were directly reacting to the relationship between the par-
ties rather than just to their interaction through a tangible object.  
However, Green’s analysis breaks down when he insists (i) that the re-
lationship always involved a third party (beyond the litigants) and (ii) 
that the relationship needed to preexist the dispute in question.54  By 
relaxing these two assumptions, we can make sense of why courts were 
treating some interests as property-like:  the courts were looking to the 
consequences and effects of the exclusionary framework on the parties’ 
relationship (or interaction). 
Generally speaking, then, quasi-property interests originate in the 
circumstances of parties’ relationships broadly understood.  What trig-
gers courts’ identification of these relationships (for their invocation 
of quasi-property) is (i) the status of the parties vis-à-vis each other, (ii) 
the unique environment or context within which they interact, (iii) the 
nature—wrongful or otherwise—of one party’s actions, or (iv) a combi-
nation of these factors.  Each of these factors requires brief elucidation. 
1.  Status 
In situations where the law seeks to regulate parties’ interactions 
over a resource as a result of their unique status vis-à-vis each other, 
quasi-property proves an ideal vehicle.  The paradigmatic instance is of 
course the “hot news” misappropriation doctrine, which endows time-
sensitive news with exclusionary significance only when the parties are 
direct competitors in the same market, a requirement that involves an 
analysis of their relationship.55  Their status as competitors in the same 
 
30 ILL. L. REV. 1 (1935) [hereinafter Green, Relational Interests (pt. 2)]; Leon Green, 
Relational Interests, 31 ILL. L. REV. 35 (1936). 
52 See, e.g., Green, Relational Interests (pt. 1), supra note 51, at 461 (“This inadequacy 
of classification has proved extremely costly to legal science . . . .”). 
53 Id. at 460, 462. 
54 See id. at 462 (“While in hurts to personality, or property only two parties, plain-
tiff and defendant, are involved, in hurts to relationship interests, three parties must 
always be involved.”). 
55 See Int’l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 239-40 (1918) (explaining 
that the test for misappropriation examines “the rights of complainant and defendant, 
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market is thought to necessitate ensuring that one doesn’t free ride on 
the information gathered by the other through the creation of an 
exclusionary framework limited to the duration for which the parties 
retain this status as competitors.56 
Another domain where the status of a party imbues a resource with 
limited exclusionary significance is that of insider trading.57  There, 
courts endow market-sensitive factual information with limited exclu-
sionary significance when obtained and used by someone who has the 
status of a fiduciary to the source.58  What seems to matter in these set-
tings where the law emphasizes the parties’ status is the fact that the 
parties’ objective/relative positions mandate that they pay greater at-
tention to the manner in which they obtain and use certain resources.59  
The normative focus of the regime is thus on the harm that is likely to 
occur directly from their status (e.g., unfair competition or market 
fraud) rather than any harm to the resource or through its use in the 
abstract.60 
 
competitors in business, as between themselves,” rather than “the rights of the com-
plainant as against the public,” since the purchaser of a newspaper has different rights 
in relation to the seller and the news than does the competitor who would “transmit 
that news for commercial use . . . in order to divert a material portion of the profit 
from those who have earned it”); see also Shyamkrishna Balganesh, “Hot News”:  The 
Enduring Myth of Property in News, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 419, 438-40 (2011) (elaborating 
on the relational requirement in the misappropriation doctrine). 
56 See Balganesh, supra note 55, at 448-49 (“In the Court’s understanding, free rid-
ing was problematic because it allowed a competitor to lower its costs and compete on 
unfair terms with a collector of the news.”). 
57 See United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 653-54 (1997) (adopting the misap-
propriation theory for insider trading).  Misappropriation theory and insider trading 
are closely related.  See Zohar Goshen & Gideon Parchomovsky, On Insider Trading, 
Markets, and “Negative” Property Rights in Information, 87 VA. L. REV. 1229, 1266-68 (2001); 
Kimberly D. Krawiec, Privatizing “Outsider Trading,” 41 VA. J. INT’L L. 693, 696 (2001). 
58 See O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 656 (“[T]he fiduciary’s fraud is consummated, not when 
the fiduciary gains the confidential information, but when, without disclosure to the 
principal, he uses the information to purchase or sell securities.”); see also Saikrishna 
Prakash, Our Dysfunctional Insider Trading Regime, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1491, 1504-06 
(1999) (“[T]he misappropriating trader deceives those who entrusted her with confi-
dential information.” (footnote omitted)). 
59 Cf. Dennis W. Carlton & Daniel R. Fischel, The Regulation of Insider Trading, 35 
STAN. L. REV. 857, 866-72 (1983) (discussing possible reasons for allocating property 
rights in corporate information to “insiders” rather than shareholders). 
60 See O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 656. 
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2.  Context 
In some instances, the environment within which the parties inter-
act over the resource is one that is especially sensitive and deserving of 
protection.  By treating the resource as a form of quasi-property and 
imbuing it with limited exclusionary significance, the law seeks to 
protect the parties’ interests in circumstances under which they are 
most likely to be affected.  The quasi-property nature of sepulchral 
rights belongs to this category.  As courts have long noted, the common 
law came to endow a corpse with limited exclusionary rights vested only 
in parties who were likely to suffer emotional anguish upon an inter-
ference, and deemed these rights to be infringed only by activities that 
were in turn most likely to cause such anguish directly.61  Thus, courts 
have limited such quasi-property claims to “close family members,”62 and 
have cabined the nature of a required infraction to an “intrusion, man-
handling, or manipulation” of the corpse.63  They have also disallowed 
monetary claims for conversion64 or for mere invasions of privacy.65  
Much as with status, the primary harm that the law of sepulchral rights 
seeks to protect originates in the effects of the defendant’s actions on 
the plaintiff’s circumstantially vulnerable emotional wellbeing, rather 
than any harm to the res as such. 
3.  Conduct 
A third set of situations in which the law invokes the quasi-property 
idea involves a defendant’s morally ambiguous behavior, which, 
though directed at the plaintiff, affects some res.  Here, courts often 
hesitate to create a full-blown property interest in the res for either 
 
61 See supra notes 28-36 and accompanying text. 
62 Boorman v. Nev. Mem’l Cremation Soc’y, Inc., 236 P.3d 4, 8 (Nev. 2010). 
63 Riley v. St. Louis County, 153 F.3d 627, 630 (8th Cir. 1998); accord Culpepper v. 
Pearl St. Bldg., Inc., 877 P.2d 877, 880 (Colo. 1994) (“Clearly, there can be no property 
right in a dead body in a commercial sense, since a dead body cannot be bartered or 
sold.  Some courts have recognized a quasi-property right in dead bodies for the limited 
purpose of seeing that the body is decently interred or disposed of.”). 
64 See, e.g., Culpepper, 877 P.2d at 882 & n.6; Boorman, 236 P.3d at 9; see also Bauer v. 
N. Fulton Med. Ctr., Inc., 527 S.E.2d 240, 244 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999) (explaining that 
because Mrs. Bauer “has no pecuniary interest in her husband’s corpse, . . . accordingly, 
Mr. Bauer’s corneal tissue is not subject to valuation” with respect to her conversion 
claim). 
65 See, e.g., Riley, 153 F.3d at 631 (denying a Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment in-
vasion of privacy claim because the protection is for highly personal matters only). 
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formal or substantive reasons.66  They choose instead to impose liability 
on the defendant by tailoring the law’s exclusionary framework to the 
conduct that they seek to censure.  The law of trade secrets—as well as 
the multiple causes of action under the heading of unfair competi-
tion—fits this description in large measure.67   
We might also include within this category situations in which the 
party whose actions are morally ambiguous isn’t the potential plaintiff.  
Various kinds of equitable claims (such as liens) that are recognized by 
courts but are nonetheless treated as inferior to another party’s 
stronger claim are good examples here.68  For instance, some courts 
treat the doctrine of accession as creating a quasi-property right in the 
mistaken improver’s contribution to the resource.69  Such a claim is 
treated as inferior to the true owner’s superior claim—it doesn’t come 
into existence unless the improver’s conduct, which, while technically 
a trespass, is nonetheless found to have been in good faith.70 
 
66 The distinction between formal and substantive reasons here often implicates 
courts’ equitable, as opposed to ordinary common law, jurisdiction. 
67 See, e.g., E.I. du Pont de Nemours Powder Co. v. Masland, 244 U.S. 100, 102 
(1917) (noting how the focus was on behavior and not the asset itself); Shyamkrishna 
Balganesh & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Role of Unfair Competition in the Common Law 
(describing the nature of the focus in greater detail), in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND 
THE COMMON LAW (Shyamkrishna Balganesh ed., forthcoming 2012); Ramon A. Klitzke, 
Trade Secrets:  Important Quasi -Property Rights, 41 BUS. LAW. 555, 557 (1986) (“It is clear that 
[trade secret protection’s] home port is fairness and honesty between business compet-
itors.”). 
68 See, e.g., Hunter v. Blanchard, 18 Ill. 318, 323-24 (1857) (finding a supplier of 
building materials to have a lien over his contribution to the building); V.S. Cook 
Lumber Co. v. Harris, 71 P.2d 446, 450-51 (Okla. 1937) (treating the interest of a share-
holder who has borrowed on his stock as quasi-property, subject to the superior claim 
of the corporation); Att’y Gen. v. Chi. & Nw. Ry. Co., 35 Wis. 425, 578-80 (1874) (up-
holding, against a Contracts Clause challenge, the right of the state to set the maxi-
mum tolls that the defendant railroad companies could charge passengers or freight 
shippers, since “[a]s far as the franchise [to toll] is considered property, it was subject 
to this limitation,” reserved by the state, that the franchise could be altered); MARIE C. 
MALARO, A LEGAL PRIMER ON MANAGING MUSEUM COLLECTIONS 188-89 (1985) (de-
scribing a museum’s interest as a gratuitous bailee or trustee in terms akin to quasi-
property). 
69 See Harmon D. Maxson, Comment, Property—Damages for Timber Trespass, 1 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 434, 436 n.7 (1958) (noting that, with regard to the property principles 
presented in Wooden-Ware Co. v. United States, 106 U.S. 432 (1882), “it is recognized even 
in courts of law that an equitable and quasi-property right is acquired by one who in 
good faith adds value to the property by his labor, although the property . . . may be 
that of another”). 
70 Id. at 436 n.6. 
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*      *      * 
It should be fairly apparent from the discussion above that the cate-
gories of facts that trigger the law’s choice of a quasi-property frame-
work are hardly watertight.  A party’s status might thus in some in-
instances inform the court’s analysis of its conduct (as in International 
News Service) or motivate the adoption of a quasi-property framework.  
What is crucial in all these settings is that the law’s choice not to endow 
the resource with objective exclusionary significance is both conscious and 
analytically meaningful. 
B.  Signaling Relational Exclusion 
Having seen the conditions under which the law might choose to 
endow an actual or notional res with limited exclusionary significance, 
it is worth exploring how exactly the law chooses to communicate this 
decision.  Liability regimes impose duties and obligations on actors that 
are best described as “relational” in nature, since they identify both an 
action that triggers liability and an actor to whom the obligation is 
owed.71  Property law, too, operates as a system of liability, notwith-
standing its in rem nature characterized paradigmatically by the law of 
trespass.72  And while it may be true that, under property law, actors 
owe a duty of forbearance to the individuals who own the res in ques-
tion, this obligation is communicated via the res, which mediates it.  
This structure occasionally produces the mistaken idea that the obliga-
tion is owed to the resource and not to the individual.  In quasi-
property, on the other hand, the law endows the res with only limited 
exclusionary significance, yet the directive is almost never communi-
cated through the res itself. 
 
71 See John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Torts as Wrongs, 88 TEX. L. REV. 
917, 945-46 (2010) (describing torts as “relational, injury-inclusive wrongs”); Zipursky, 
supra note 15, at 88-93 (1998) (describing tort law as “rights, wrongs, and recourse”). 
72 I am conscious here not to equate the regime of liability surrounding property 
rights as simple “liability rules” under the Calabresi-Melamed framework.  As scholars 
have long shown, that framework focuses largely on the “protection” of an entitlement, 
which has in recent times come to be equated with remedies rather than rights.  The 
framework also says little about the analytical bases of the underlying right that the 
regime protects or the “first-order question” about who should obtain the entitlement 
and why.  For more information on the property-rights framework, see Guido Calabresi 
& A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability:  One View of the 
Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1106-10 (1972); Jules L. Coleman & Jody Kraus, 
Rethinking the Theory of Legal Rights, 95 YALE L.J. 1335, 1347-52 (1986); and Henry E. 
Smith, Exclusion and Property Rules in the Law of Nuisance, 90 VA. L. REV. 965, 973 (2004). 
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Quasi-property revolves around a directive best described as “rela-
tional forbearance.”  Such a regime imposes (and communicates) a 
limited duty of forbearance on individuals when they acquire a partic-
ular status in relation to the interest-holder, or when the context of 
their interaction or conduct necessitates limited exclusion.  This duty 
of forbearance is only ever imposed relationally, by reference to the 
interest-holder rather than the object of the interest.  Individuals are 
directed by the law to avoid interfering with the object of the interest 
under a particular set of circumstances, defined with a good measure of 
specificity.  By emphasizing the circumstances of interference rather 
than the interference itself, the law moves away from the object and 
towards the relationship between the interest-holder and the interferer.  
In the process, the normative basis of exclusion moves away from the 
boundaries of the object and towards the circumstances necessitating 
exclusion.  It is this feature that differentiates the law of trespass from 
the category of quasi-property.  While trespass law emphasizes the 
boundaries of the object as the source of the duty of forbearance, quasi-
property, on the other hand, communicates forbearance relationally 
and with reference to the unique circumstances calling for exclusion. 
The rationale for employing relational forbearance instead of a 
general duty of forbearance in turn derives from the law’s need to 
make clear the precise reasons for the exclusionary framework.  Quasi-
property serves to break what is often referred to as the “irreducibility 
of ownership”—the belief that property and ownership as conceptual 
devices preclude any further investigation into the reasons for which 
they exist.73  By refraining from endowing the res in question with the 
objective status of an “owned” resource, quasi-property draws attention 
to the reasons why the law might nonetheless choose to endow the 
interest in question with limited exclusionary significance.  Often, it 
turns out that these reasons have little to do with the abstract connec-
tion between the interest-holder and the object—believed to be central 
to property—but rather derive from a specific context or setting within 
which that connection becomes necessary to further other values or 
goals.  The commodification of the object is clearly secondary to other 
interests, and the quasi-property framework allows for these other 
interests to be considered more directly.   
 
73 This idea owes its origins to Jim Harris.  See J.W. HARRIS, PROPERTY AND JUSTICE 
64-66 (1996) (“Ownership acts as an irreducible organizing idea in the daily, non-
contested functioning of a property institution.  No inferential move from the content 
of all these rules can give us a list of the privileges and powers which ownership entails.”). 
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In important work, Henry Smith has shown how property law at-
tempts to delineate rights through either an “exclusion” strategy, 
which focuses on a “thing” and simple on/off signals for the directive 
(e.g., boundary-crossing as trespass), and a “governance” strategy, which 
is more fine-grained and involves a more circumstantial determination 
of when a right is infringed.74  The choice of strategy is thought to em-
anate from the law’s attempt to optimize information costs.75  More 
recently, Smith has extended this analysis to the property/tort interface 
to argue that “[w]here property starts with a thing as the beginning for 
delineating rights, tort law takes action as its starting point.”76  Although 
Smith doesn’t directly address the source of the directive in either 
formulation, his theory suggests that property law’s in rem directives 
emanate from the thing itself, while in tort law they originate in the 
duties of care around which tort law’s focus on an individual’s actions 
revolve.77  Smith thus implies that there is a continuum wherein the 
law’s focus moves from thing to action—depending on its normative 
focus—embodied in the move from property to tort.  From a commu-
nicative standpoint, this move manifests itself in shifting the focus 
from communicating the directive as a general exclusionary message 
via the res to a more nuanced action-based command via relational 
duties. 
Quasi-property interests originate precisely at this transition point.  
What Smith characterizes as actions can be disaggregated into conduct, 
context, and status, all of which generate obligations against which the 
defendant’s “actions” are judged in the assessment of liability.  As the 
law moves away from communicating its obligations through the thing 
and towards doing so through relational duties, it comes to a point 
where the costs of imprecision favor greater granularity in the regime.  
Even so, the res continues to remain a viable mechanism around which, 
rather than through which, to communicate that signal.  The thing, in 
 
74 See Henry E. Smith, Exclusion Versus Governance:  Two Strategies for Delineating Prop-
erty Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S453, S467-78 (2002) [hereinafter Smith, Exclusion Versus 
Governance] (casting exclusion and governance as rules of access and of use, applied 
according to their respective costs and benefits); see also Henry E. Smith, Intellectual 
Property as Property:  Delineating Entitlements in Information, 116 YALE L.J. 1742, 1749 
(2007) [hereinafter Smith, Intellectual Property as Property] (applying this distinction to 
explain the difference between patent and copyright law). 
75 Smith, Exclusion Versus Governance, supra note 74, at S467-71. 
76 Henry E. Smith, Modularity and Morality in the Law of Torts, 4 J. TORT L., no. 2, 
2011, at 1, 14. 
77 Id. at 14. 
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other words, forms the focal point for the relational duties from which 
the law generates its obligations, even though it doesn’t form the con-
duit for the obligations as such. 
It is indeed this narrow set of interests that seem to fit the descrip-
tion of quasi-property.  Smith is therefore correct to fault theories of 
tort law that he describes as “commodification”-based, which attempt 
to treat any interest protected by liability as a proprietary one (e.g., 
reputation or a business opportunity), and to suggest that in reality 
something else is going on in these contexts.78  In the next Part, I pro-
pose some possible answers to explain what these regimes are trying to 
achieve normatively.  At the very least, however, a major structural dif-
ference that Smith’s observation captures is the fact that these quasi-
property regimes communicate a fundamentally different kind of exclu-
sionary signal:  one that relates to the thing, but which is nonetheless 
rooted in the background conditions relating to the parties’ interac-
tions surrounding the thing.   
II.  REASONS FOR QUASI-PROPERTY INTERESTS 
Having examined in the previous Part how quasi-property interests 
work and the way in which they communicate their exclusionary signal 
to actors, this Part examines why the law might select the framework of 
quasi-property for certain kinds of interests.  Why, in other words, 
might the law want an interest to function like property, without call-
ing it a full-blown property interest?  In answering this question, I dis-
tinguish between two kinds of conflicting influences.  The first are best 
described as affirmative influences, or reasons that might push the law 
toward treating certain interests as regular property rights to begin 
with.  To some extent, these influences track ordinary reasons for the 
emergence of property rights in the ordinary setting.  The second set 
of influences push in the exact opposite direction and inject a mean-
ingful degree of caution into the framing of the interest; we might call 
these factors negative influences.  Some combination of affirmative and 
negative determinants therefore results in the law’s choosing to cabin 
the exclusionary regime relationally, and to this end adopting the idea 
of quasi-property.  The affirmative influences explain the property ele-
ment of quasi-property, while the negative ones account for the quasi 
element. 
 
78 See id. at 6-9, 14-16 (describing situations in which both property and tort law 
may apply, and others in which one or the other is more appropriate). 
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At the outset, two important cautionary notes about these influ-
ences are in order.  First, the determinants identified here are largely 
(if not exclusively) instrumental in their orientation.79  It necessarily 
follows that the law’s reasons for choosing quasi-property as a category 
in some instances must be instrumental, as well.  While not precluded, 
an immanent explanation for the evolution of these interests remains 
less plausible given the relatively recent nature of these interests as a 
formal category (in comparison to property).80  Second, in seeking to 
explain why quasi-property interests emerge in different contexts and 
in offering reasons for their emergence, I do not suggest that common 
law courts have engaged in some kind of concerted attempt to move 
the law in a particular direction.  As with much of the common law, 
these developments have occurred across time and context, oftentimes 
without any reference to each other.81  Despite this caveat, this Part 
seeks to establish that these interests nevertheless did not develop in an 
entirely ad hoc manner. 
A.  Affirmative Influences 
The first group of influences is in some sense propertarian, since 
they motivate the law towards creating a property interest around the 
res in question.  Such influences track the law’s instrumental justifica-
tions for the creation of property rights in resources.   
1.  Preserving Economic Value 
Starting with the work of Harold Demsetz, economists have long 
posited that property rights emerge in scenarios where the benefits of 
internalization outweigh the costs of exclusion.82  A milder version of 
 
79 I use the word “instrumental” here in the broadest sense of the term, and not 
necessarily to implicate utilitarian or social welfare–related objectives. 
80 For an intrinsic account of the common law’s core conceptual categories, see 
BIRKS, supra note 1, at 20-32.  In contrast to Birks’s account, my account here con-
sciously recognizes that courts do develop common law concepts and categories in the 
pursuit of policy goals. 
81 For a similar account of the common law in relation to intellectual property, see 
generally Shyamkrishna Balganesh, The Pragmatic Incrementalism of Common Law Intellec-
tual Property, 63 VAND. L. REV. 1543 (2010). 
82 See, e.g., Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 
347, 348 (1967) (“A primary function of property rights is that of guiding incentives to 
achieve a greater internalization of externalities.”); see also Terry L. Anderson & P.J. 
Hill, The Evolution of Property Rights:  A Study of the American West, 18 J.L. & ECON. 163, 
165 (1975) (“Establishing and protecting property rights is very much a productive 
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this thesis is seen in some quasi-property interests, where the belief is 
that the nature of the parties’ interaction around a thing is likely to di-
minish its objective market value, thereby necessitating limited exclu-
sion.  Quasi-property interests emanating from the idea of unfair 
competition are paradigmatic of this concern, which in some sense 
tracks the idea of free riding.83  Unlike traditional intellectual property, 
however, the economic value that the law seeks to preserve does not 
emanate from exclusivity as such, since that would render the motiva-
tion circular.  Instead, the economic value is thought to derive from a 
party’s actions, for which the thing forms an easy and indirect referent.   
2.  Creating an Identifiable Focal Point for Coordination 
Legal rules operate by providing individual actors with a common 
focal point around which to coordinate their behavior.  They perform 
an important guidance function by helping to set expectations as to 
what other actors will do in a particular setting.84  Property law has 
long been known to perform this function in different social settings 
by mediating its directives of exclusion through the res.85 
 
activity toward which resources can be devoted.  But, like any other activity, the amount 
of this investment will depend upon the marginal benefits and costs to investors of 
allocating resources to these endeavors.”); Thomas W. Merrill, Introduction:  The Demsetz 
Thesis and the Evolution of Property Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S331, S332 (2002) (“Desmetz 
hypothesized that property rights emerge when some change in the relative value of 
resources occurs that makes it cost-effective to internalize costs that previously were 
experienced as externalities . . . .”). 
83 See Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L. REV. 
1031, 1033 (2005) (arguing that, in the intellectual property context, courts and com-
mentators treat such property as real property—which “leads them to an almost obses-
sive preoccupation with identifying and rooting out that great evil of the modern 
economic world—free riding”). 
84 Richard H. McAdams, A Focal Point Theory of Expressive Law, 86 VA. L. REV. 1649, 
1651 (2000); see also Richard H. McAdams & Janice Nadler, Coordinating in the Shadow of 
the Law:  Two Contextualized Tests of the Focal Point Theory of Legal Compliance, 42 LAW & 
SOC’Y REV. 865, 866 (2008) (“[W]hen the parties involved have some common incentive 
to ‘coordinate’ their behavior, the law’s articulation of a behavior will tend to create self-
fulfilling expectations that it will occur.”).  Indeed, recent experimental evidence seems 
to suggest that the focal point theory, at least in a modified form, holds true for property 
law.  See Jonathan Remy Nash & Stephanie M. Stern, Property Frames, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 
449, 452 (2010) (“How a property entitlement is framed . . . will affect the attitudes and 
behaviors of societal actors subject to legal rules and influence policymakers as they 
choose among possible legal rules.”). 
85 See Merrill & Smith, supra note 16, at 788 (describing how the two-way nature of 
property’s in rem structure performs this coordination function through the res); 
PENNER, supra note 11, at 49. 
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Quasi-property interests incorporate this element of property into 
their functioning.  While they signal liability for certain actions, they 
frame the liability regime around an actual or notional res in under-
standing the action in question, thereby enabling individuals to coor-
dinate their behavior not solely by reference to the action, but also by 
reference to the res.  The right of sepulcher is a good example.  While 
the liability regime certainly focuses on the defendant’s actions and 
the likely emotional harm they will cause to the plaintiff, the actions 
are judged by reference to their effects on the corpse (the res), not 
their effects on the plaintiff directly.86  In turn, this channeling through 
the res allows actors (medical examiners, mortuaries, etc.) to coordi-
nate their behavior around the res. 
3.  Expanding Remedial Options 
Perhaps the most obvious reason why courts might choose to char-
acterize some interests as being endowed with attributes of property 
derives from the special treatment that proprietary rights historically 
received in equity.87  Historically, equitable (or extraordinary) reme-
dies were restricted to rights that were proprietary rather than personal 
in nature, and over time, courts strove to structure the regimes they 
were creating as proprietary in nature in order to avail themselves of 
such remedies.88 
Scholars have long noted the absurdities that this distinction created 
before it eventually broke down.89  Nonetheless, the impulse motivating 
 
86 In other words, on the assumption that it will have caused mental anguish, the 
interference with the corpse is considered sufficient to trigger liability.  This cause of 
action does not require an independent showing of such anguish or harm, as is re-
quired for the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress.  Boorman v. Nev. Mem’l 
Cremation Soc’y, Inc., 236 P.3d 4, 8 (Nev. 2010). 
87 See, e.g., Gee v. Pritchard, (1818) 36 Eng. Rep. 670 (Ct. Ch.) 674 (noting that re-
lief in equity for libel could only be sustained on protection of rights of property).  For 
early accounts documenting and criticizing this rule, see Roscoe Pound, Equitable Relief 
Against Defamation and Injuries to Personality, 29 HARV. L. REV. 640, 642-46, 668-77 (1916), 
and Joseph R. Long, Equitable Jurisdiction to Protect Personal Rights, 33 YALE L.J. 115, 122-
26 (1923). 
88 See generally Green, Relational Interests (pt. 2), supra note 51, at 39-40 (describing 
how English courts invoked the idea of property in order to sustain equitable jurisdic-
tion). 
89 Id.; see also Green, Relational Interests (pt. 1), supra note 51, at 461 (“Courts, having 
assumed that equity would only protect a property interest, have constantly expanded 
the property concept to include every sort of valuable interest which they deemed worthy 
of protection.”); William Bliss Giles, Note, A Re-Interpretation of Gee v. Pritchard, 25 MICH. 
L. REV. 889, 889 (1927) (explaining that the Gee rule “has been so severely criticized 
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this distinction remains, and in no small measure.  The movement to-
wards treating some forms of privacy claims as centered around “prop-
erty”90—and indeed the recent debates about the availability of 
injunctive relief for intellectual property91—are evidence of this impulse.  
Treating an entitlement as covered by a quasi-property framework 
might thus allow for equitable relief to become readily available for 
infraction of the entitlement.  In fact, some courts view the Court’s use 
of the concept of “quasi-property” in International News Service as moti-
vated by precisely this objective.92 
B.  Negative Influences 
In contrast to affirmative influences, which explain why courts re-
main influenced by the idea and metaphor of property in their con-
struction of the quasi-property interest, another set of influences—
which I label negative influences—push courts in the exact opposite 
direction.  These influences explain why the law doesn’t go all the way 
toward classifying the interests in question as property rights.  In equi-
librium with one another, the affirmative and negative influences pro-
duce the midway position of quasi -property interests. 
 
and so strained in its application that one is inclined to doubt that it has appreciable 
vigor at the present time”). 
90 See Jessica Litman, Information Privacy/Information Property, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1283, 
1289 (2000) (noting a “recent upsurge” in “[t]reating privacy as a property right”); 
Pamela Samuelson, Privacy as Intellectual Property?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1125, 1127 (2000) 
(explaining that “some American commentators have proposed that the law should 
grant individuals a property right in their personal data”); Sonia M. Suter, Disentangling 
Privacy from Property:  Toward a Deeper Understanding of Genetic Privacy, 72 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 737, 744-45 (2004) (discussing the issue of “whether genetic information should 
be treated as property”). 
91 See Balganesh, supra note 11, at 649-50 (explaining that “the Federal Circuit had 
developed a general rule in the context of patent injunctions, under which the courts 
granted plaintiffs a permanent injunction once validity and infringement were factually 
proven”). 
92 For example, in Victoria Park Racing & Recreation Grounds Co. v Taylor, the High 
Court of Australia agreed with Justice Brandeis’s dissent in International News Service  and 
observed that 
courts of equity have not in British jurisdictions thrown the protection of an in-
junction around all the intangible elements of value, that is, value in exchange, 
which may flow from the exercise by an individual of his powers or resources 
whether in the organization of a business or undertaking or the use of ingenuity, 
knowledge, skill or labour. 
(1937) 58 CLR 479, 509 (Austl.). 
Balganesh Revised Final.doc (DO NOT DELETE) 6/7/2012 7:55 AM 
1914 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 160: 1889 
 
1.  Avoiding Expressive Commodification 
Commodification refers to the process by which some thing comes 
to be understood in the popular mind as a “commodity” to which a 
price can be attached, and for which a market exists.93  Integral to this 
process is the identification of the thing that then operates as the 
commodity.  Commodification as a process is thought to entail both an 
extrinsic and an intrinsic dimension—with the former referring to the 
way in which outsiders perceive participants’ interaction around an 
object, and the latter to the way in which insiders themselves model 
their interaction around the object.94  In numerous contexts, however, 
the law and/or actors within a specific social setting find the process of 
“commodifying” certain objects or values to be deeply problematic.95  
Such objections may emanate from both deontological precepts (e.g., 
not wanting to treat babies as things in adoption law), or from purely 
instrumental ones (e.g., not wanting to encourage the trade of babies 
because of the regulatory problems that it is likely to engender).   
What is important here is that commodification as a process can 
come about both through the law’s actual regulation of behavior and 
in its expressive dimension.96  In the former, the law’s active treatment 
of certain items as tradable commodities becomes relevant, whereas in 
the latter the law’s signaling that some items are to be treated analo-
gously to commodities is what matters.  Although the two often go to-
gether, they do not have to.  It is the latter set of scenarios that courts 
see as problematic in some quasi-property contexts.  A court’s identifi-
cation of an object as a res certainly doesn’t result in it being commod-
ified as an operational matter, in the sense of creating a market for the 
object as such.  It nonetheless signals that the law conceives of the object 
as a commodity, albeit for a limited, regulatory purpose:  what one 
might call “expressive commodification.”  And much like in other types 
of commodification, this limited, expressive commodification is also 
seen as problematic—for the same kinds of reasons as in the original 
context of commodification.97  In turn, this impulse is what pushes the 
 
93 See MARGARET JANE RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES 1-2 (1996). 
94 Id. at 2-3. 
95 Id. at 131. 
96 See Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021, 
2036-38 (1996) (discussing how and why social norms ban “commodification”); id. at 
2045-48 (using emissions trading in environmental law as an example of how commod-
ification can come about through the law’s expressive function). 
97 Id. at 2036-38. 
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common law to adopt the category of quasi-property, a position mid-
way between declaring an object to have full exclusionary significance 
and giving it no such significance at all. 
We see this influence at play in relation to both sepulchral rights 
and the misappropriation doctrine.  With regard to sepulchral rights, 
common law courts have explicitly observed that calling a corpse 
someone’s property or an owned object is problematic for moral (and 
sentimental) reasons.98  Indeed, courts have thought such commodifi-
cation problematic, even for the limited purpose of providing redress 
for interference with the corpse.  This impulse to avoid commodifying 
corpses as an expressive matter thus moved the law in the direction of 
quasi-property.   
The same logic was at work in International News Service, where the 
Court held that the news, the “history of the day,” the object that the 
plaintiff sought to be infused with exclusionary significance as a form 
of property, was instead “publici juris”—“common property” that could 
not be owned privately.99  Again, the Court might have called the news 
“property” for the limited purpose at hand, yet the impulse against 
expressive commodification once again seems to have pushed in the 
other direction. 
2.  Preserving the Ethereality of Subject Matter 
Creating a property right around a res necessarily requires identi-
fying the boundaries of the res that is being endowed with exclusion-
ary significance.  And when the exclusionary signal or directive is 
mediated entirely through the res, determining its boundaries thus 
assumes additional functional significance.  Despite property law’s move 
away from the “lay” or unscientific conception of property as a thing, 
identifying the res—either as a factual or notional matter—still con-
tinues to influence the way in which property works.100  In relation to 
tangible resources, defining the res poses few problems (if any).  With 
 
98 See, e.g., Bauer v. N. Fulton Med. Ctr., Inc., 527 S.E.2d 240, 244 (Ga. Ct. App. 
1999) (“The quasi-property right in a corpse is not pecuniary in nature, nor should it 
be . . . . [O]ur laws . . . will not impose a pecuniary value on the flesh itself.  To do so 
would make the strangest thing on earth that much stranger.”); see also PROSSER & 
KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS, supra note 30, § 12, at 63 (“It seems reasonably obvious 
that such ‘property’ is something evolved out of thin air to meet the occasion, and that 
it is in reality the personal feelings of the survivors which are being protected . . . .”). 
99 Int’l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 234-35 (1918). 
100 For a description of the unscientific or lay conception of property, see BRUCE A. 
ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION 26-27 (1977). 
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intangibles, however, defining the boundaries of the res is hardly a 
costless exercise.101  Delineating the metes and bounds of an intangible 
in order to give it exclusionary salience involves significant administra-
tive and judicial costs.  A good example here is intellectual property, 
where the legal system has historically attempted to optimize the costs 
of delineating the res in multiple ways—ranging from a voluntary self-
identification (i.e., claiming) system, requiring various kinds of formal-
ities, or by mandating a deposit of the item being endowed with exclu-
sionary significance.102 
Costs aside, one can also see independent affirmative reasons for 
the legal system to avoid defining the precise boundaries of the res.  
Most, if not all, quasi-property regimes originated in the common law 
and thus emerged in the context of liability regimes that developed 
inductively by generalizing from the context of a particular dispute.103  
All the same, in order to survive and develop incrementally, the prin-
ciple of liability that developed needed to do more than deal with the 
specifics of the dispute before the court.  Because the common law 
speaks in generalities, courts developing quasi-property regimes began 
to abstract from the particular in order to preserve their legitimacy 
and future applicability.104  Thus, even when they came to identify a 
res, courts instinctively gravitated towards generalizing its essence 
rather than specifying or delineating it with precision.  That task was 
relegated to the stage of rule application.   
Trade secrets are a good example of this phenomenon; so, too, are 
notions of the “distinctiveness” of a trademark and attributes of an indi-
vidual’s “persona”—all of which are technically the res of quasi-property 
interests.  What we see in such scenarios is that the law consciously 
avoids delineating the intangible subject matter of protection with any 
measure of precision, and instead describes the subject matter by class, 
 
101 See Smith, Intellectual Property as Property, supra note 74, at 1787, 1793 (envisioning 
a model to explain the cost of clarifying boundaries of the protected “res” in intellectual 
property law). 
102 See generally Jeanne C. Fromer, Claiming Intellectual Property, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 
719, 730-52 (2009) (describing the claiming systems in both patent and copyright law).   
103 See OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, Codes, and the Arrangement of the Law (1870), re-
printed in THE COLLECTED WORKS OF JUSTICE HOLMES 212, 212 (Sheldon M. Novick 
ed., 1995) (“It is the merit of the common law that it decides the case first and deter-
mines the principle afterwards.”). 
104 See id. at 213 (“New cases will arise which will elude the most carefully constructed 
formula.  The common law, proceeding . . . by a series of successive approximations—
by a continual reconciliation of cases—is prepared for this, and simply modifies the 
form of its rule.”). 
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characteristic, or category in the belief that the delineation is best 
achieved from within the context of adjudicating an infraction and not 
prior to it.  The law, in other words, chooses to preserve the fluidity of 
the res, and to adjudicate the possibility of any boundary crossing ex 
post. 
3.  Tailoring the Res to the Actio 
A third influence derives from the law’s need to tailor the interest 
involved with a high degree of precision because of the costs associated 
with overinclusiveness.  In some ways, this point flows from, and is intri-
cately connected with, the previous one.  On the one hand, the law 
seeks to preserve the unbounded nature of the res to allow for flexibility 
and applicability to future contexts.  Generalizing or abstracting to the 
res from the particular context of the dispute is thus central to preserv-
ing this flexibility.  On the other hand, it must not be forgotten that 
the law’s ultimate focus is on the defendant’s behavior, which the law 
seeks to regulate through a mechanism of liability.  Thus, while flexi-
bility cuts in favor of generalization, which in turn motivates a general 
reluctance to define the precise boundaries of the res, the focus on 
the defendant’s behavior seeks to align the boundaries of the res with 
the actions that trigger liability.105  While these two influences aren’t 
diametrically opposed, they nonetheless complicate the process of de-
fining the res around an identifiable object. 
The law of trade secrets is a good example of this phenomenon.  
The need to develop a generalizable regime pushed the common law 
in the direction of treating any valuable information that was subject 
to some measure of secrecy as a possible trade secret.106  However, such 
an abstract definition results in a weak exclusionary signal.  Moreover, 
trade secret law has long been thought to exist in order to ensure 
“[t]he maintenance of standards of commercial ethics” among market 
actors.107  Thus emerged the idea that the taking (or misappropriation) 
of a trade secret could come about only when the secret was acquired 
 
105 This theory of trade secret law corresponds roughly to what Smith has described 
as the “governance strategy” for organizing property rights.  Smith, Exclusion Versus 
Governance, supra note 74, at S455-56. 
106 See, e.g., Robert G. Bone, A New Look at Trade Secret Law:  Doctrine in Search of Justi-
fication, 86 CALIF. L. REV. 241, 248 (1998) (“[A]lmost anything can qualify as a trade 
secret, provided it has the potential to generate commercial value . . . [including] cus-
tomer lists, pricing information, business methods and plans, and marketing research 
data.” (footnotes omitted)). 
107 Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 481 (1974). 
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through “improper means.”108  Notice that the nature of the res of such 
a trade secret is transformed.  The res is now any valuable information 
subject to secrecy, if and when it is acquired through improper means. 
On its face, this construction may seem absurd.109  Why should the 
nature of the interference have any bearing on the structure of the 
res?  The answer is that in the absence of any other indicator, the 
understanding of the interference forms the only exclusionary signal 
that relates to the res.  The improper means idea—the notion that the 
regime seeks to regulate a certain type of action—is functionally as 
much a part of what constitutes a trade secret as is the underlying in-
formation itself.  The action, simply put, influences the functional 
conception of the res. 
What accounts for this influence, then, is the law’s functional focus 
on the defendant’s activity.  In order to focus in on the precise activities, 
the directive of liability needs to be highly granular, so a lumpy exclu-
sionary signal becomes inadequate.  A more tailored governance-style 
signal becomes necessary.  All the same, it is important to note that the 
law doesn’t formally abandon the idea of boundary-crossing that is 
central to property.  If it did, there would simply be no need to identify 
the “trade secret”; the law could simply focus on the means of appro-
priation and use.  Instead, the law adopts a midway position:  quasi-
property. 
III.  POSSIBLE OBJECTIONS 
Now that we have seen what the idea of quasi-property entails, the 
way in which it functions, and the influences that move the common 
law in the direction of creating and recognizing such interests, this 
Part considers and responds to three possible objections to the recog-
nition of quasi-property as an independent category of interests in  
the common law.  These objections derive from (A) sporadicity—that 
the law’s sporadic usage of the term ought to caution against inferring 
a coherent analytical framework for these interests; (B) analytical inco-
herence—that there might be interests in the common law that are 
property-like but analytically very different from quasi-property as  
 
108 Bone, supra note 106, at 250-51; see also UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(1) 
(amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 537 (2005) (“‘Improper means’ includes theft, bribery, 
misrepresentation, breach or inducement of a breach of a duty to maintain secrecy, or 
espionage . . . .”). 
109 Indeed, even Bone treats the “misappropriation” requirement as going to liability 
rather than the definition of trade secrets themselves.  Bone, supra note 106, at 250. 
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described here; and (C) realism—that quasi-property ought to be seen 
as a mere placeholder for courts to invoke certain remedies, conse-
quences, and results in individual cases.  I consider and respond to 
each of these objections in turn. 
A.  Sporadicity of Usage 
The claim advanced in this Article is that quasi-property refers to a 
wide set of interests in the law that involve a common analytical 
framework—one where the law seeks to simulate the functioning of 
property’s exclusionary framework relationally.  As I have shown, the 
set of interests following this pattern is, in reality, much more expan-
sive than merely the specific instances where the law has expressly 
described the interest as quasi-property.  The laws of trade secrets, 
publicity rights, idea protection regimes, and insider trading can all be 
seen as following the same analytical pattern as those instances where 
courts have explicitly described the entitlement being enforced as 
quasi-property.  All the same, one might argue that courts’ unwilling-
ness to extend the nomenclature to such settings is deliberate.  The 
sporadic nature of quasi-property recognition, this argument goes, 
represents a reticence rooted in the absence of a common analytical 
basis for these cases, which is precisely what my argument hinges on.  
By failing to call trade secrets (and other similar interests) “quasi-
property,” the argument goes, courts are in fact signaling that there is 
no such category with which to work. 
While descriptively accurate, this objection misses the functional 
significance of the argument being offered here.  In effect, it operates 
along the lines of what legal theorists call a “transparency” objection, 
or one rooted in the self-understanding of the law.110  According to the 
transparency criterion, the express reasoning offered by courts (and 
the law more generally) must necessarily correspond to its actual and 
 
110 See STEPHEN A. SMITH, CONTRACT THEORY 24-32 (2004) (explaining “transpar-
ency” as a criterion for assessing interpretive theories of contract); see also JULES L. 
COLEMAN, THE PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE:  IN DEFENCE OF A PRAGMATIST APPROACH TO 
LEGAL THEORY 27 (2001) (noting that objections based on self-understanding of tort 
law “cannot serve as a functional explanation of the core of tort law”).  But see Jody S. 
Kraus, Transparency and Determinacy in Common Law Adjudication:  A Philosophical Defense 
of Explanatory Economic Analysis, 93 VA. L. REV. 287, 349-56 (2007) (embracing the effi-
cient evolution model of the common law as “postulating a causal mechanism” under-
mining Smith and Coleman’s views of transparency).   
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unstated reasoning.111  The law’s self-understanding must track any 
understanding of it that outsiders seek to develop. 
Yet the transparency criterion is largely irrelevant in establishing 
the validity of quasi-property as an analytically independent category in 
the law.  It is irrelevant because the traditional context within which 
transparency becomes necessary is the domain of “reasoning.”112  The 
practice of legal reasoning is fundamentally different from the process 
of identifying a legal category, unless such identification is invariably 
accompanied by a strong reliance on analogy.  In the development of 
common law categories, analogies have always been drawn in factual 
rather than analytical terms.113  In other words, for example, trespass 
law almost never looks to the law of negligence for analogies, even 
though both are understood as “torts” with a common analytical 
framework revolving around the law’s imposition of an obligation on 
actors and its allowance for a claim of unliquidated damages upon 
breach.  If any reasoning by mere analogy to category is abjured, the 
need for transparency largely dissipates.  Thus, when reasoning is not 
at issue, the law’s self-understanding need not map onto our external 
understanding of how it performs its analysis.  It is precisely this nuance 
that the sporadicity objection misses. 
It thus matters very little that courts and judges themselves don’t 
expressly describe all scenarios in which they are seeking to simulate 
property’s exclusionary framework relationally as quasi-property.  Even 
if courts did describe these interests as such, little would automatically 
result.  Indeed, it is precisely in this manner that the common law’s set 
of categories has continued to evolve over the years.114  The numerous 
causes of action that are today described as relating to the law of resti-
tution for unjust enrichment represent an example of such a devel-
 
111 See SMITH, supra note 110, at 25 (“[T]o account for law’s claim to be transparent a 
legal theory of the common law must, inter alia, take account . . . of the reasons that 
judges give for their decisions.”). 
112 See, e.g., id. at 28 (“[A] good legal theory should explain the law in a way that 
shows how judges could sincerely, even if perhaps erroneously, believe that the reasons 
they give for deciding as they do are the real reasons.”). 
113 See FREDERICK SCHAUER, THINKING LIKE A LAWYER 85-102 (2009) (distinguishing 
analogy made on the basis of factual similarity from precedent); Cass R. Sunstein, 
Commentary, On Analogical Reasoning, 106 HARV. L. REV. 741, 746 (1993) (“[A]nalogical 
reasoning focuses on particulars, and it develops from concrete controversies.”). 
114 For an introduction to the mapping of legal concepts, see STEPHEN WADDAMS, 
DIMENSIONS OF PRIVATE LAW:  CATEGORIES AND CONCEPTS IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL 
REASONING 1-22 (2003). 
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opment.115  Few today would claim that the mere fact that judges do 
not make reference to the common analytical thread unifying restitu-
tion ought to negate its legitimacy as an independent category. 
B.  Incoherence from Metaphorical Use 
The incoherence objection is the exact opposite of the sporadicity 
objection.  Here the argument is that there exist numerous areas where 
the law seeks to simulate property’s functioning without describing the 
right as a property right.  The use of property as a “metaphor” in such 
disparate ways, therefore, is not an analytically coherent way of think-
ing of these interests.116  Prominent examples include the “pre-
possessory interest,”117 equitable ownership,118 restitutionary rights in 
equity,119 and entitlement claims during bankruptcy and divorce pro-
ceedings.120  In each of these situations, the law seeks to treat the interest 
or asset as a form of property for a very limited purpose.  Why, then, 
shouldn’t these interests also merit characterization as quasi-property?   
The response to this objection is fairly straightforward.  The idea 
of quasi-property advanced here entails more than the law’s mere simu-
lation or metaphorical reliance on the idea of property without also 
classifying an interest directly as a form of property.  Of fundamental 
significance to the analysis are the questions of what is being simulated 
and how this simulation is being achieved.  First, the interests identi-
fied as quasi-property seek to simulate property’s core commitment to 
 
115 See HANOCH DAGAN, THE LAW AND ETHICS OF RESTITUTION 25-36 (2004) (identi-
fying these concerns as valid but recognizing the area to present a “loose framework” 
category). 
116 See, e.g., Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Common Law Property Metaphors on the Internet:  
The Real Problem with the Doctrine of Cybertrespass, 12 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 
265, 327-31 (2006) (adopting an incoherence objection to the application of property 
metaphors to the Internet). 
117 See, e.g., Popov v. Hayashi, No. 400545, 2002 WL 31833731, at *5-8 (Cal. Super. 
Ct. Dec. 18, 2002) (holding that a baseball spectator who had caught a Barry Bonds 
baseball had a legally cognizable prepossessory interest). 
118 See, e.g., S.R.A., Inc. v. Minnesota, 327 U.S. 558, 567, 570 (1946) (describing the 
federal government’s security interest in a piece of private property as a form of “equi-
table ownership”). 
119 See, e.g., Producers Lumber & Supply Co. v. Olney Bldg. Co., 333 S.W.2d 619, 
628 (Tex. Civ. App. 1960) (“[W]hen a person, acting in good faith without negligence, 
in the mistaken belief that he is the owner of the land, erects improvements on the 
land of another, he then has an equitable interest . . . in the land . . . to the extent his 
improvements enhance[] the value of the land . . . .”). 
120 See, e.g., O’Brien v. O’Brien, 489 N.E.2d 712, 715-17 (N.Y. 1985) (declaring that 
a professional license earned during a marriage should be considered marital property). 
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exclusion.121  One may certainly advance the familiar argument that 
property is not only about exclusion, but that it also ought to focus on 
other dimensions, such as inclusions, affirmative obligations, and the 
like.122  Regardless of whether such a contention is true, the fact remains 
that quasi-property as an idea takes as given a connection between 
property and exclusion, and in turn tries to replicate this connection 
in a situational manner.  Second, the simulation isn’t a mere nominal 
or expressive one; rather, it is deeply functional.123  It uses the law’s 
liability framework and its generation of guidance rules to achieve the 
same effect as property’s exclusionary signal (which is mediated 
through the object of the property right).  Quasi-property is thus 
much more than just the attempt to replicate some effects of property 
without using the term property to describe the interest. 
In short, for an interest to be classified as quasi-property, the simu-
lation has to be of a very specific kind.  This requirement excludes a 
variety of other instances in which courts are attempting to replicate 
just some aspect of property.124  Far from enabling the unregulated 
attachment of the quasi-property label—a haphazard approach that 
would undoubtedly dilute quasi-property’s coherence—in the concep-
tion I advance, the category of quasi-property interests embodies an 
equilibrium maintained by its unique modality of property simulation. 
C.  Beyond Formalism 
The last objection to quasi-property as a category of interests origi-
nates in the legal realist critique of common law formalism.125  In this 
objection, quasi-property is seen as a mere placeholder used by courts 
to invoke a set of remedies and consequences ordinarily associated 
 
121 For more on this connection, see supra note 11 and sources cited therein. 
122 See HANOCH DAGAN, PROPERTY:  VALUES AND INSTITUTIONS 37-55 (2011); 
Gregory S. Alexander, Governance Property, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1853, 1853-60 (2012) (dis-
tinguishing exclusion property from governance property where there exists a multi-
plicity of owners and interests within the “black box”); Larissa Katz, Exclusion and 
Exclusivity in Property Law, 58 U. TORONTO L.J. 275, 285-89 (2008) (arguing that the 
exclusion approach to ownership does not tell us enough about the owner’s position). 
123 Quasi-property is vastly different from the idea of “incomplete commodifica-
tion” made famous by Margaret Radin.  See RADIN, supra note 93, at 102-03 (defining 
“incomplete commodification” as “the social state of affairs envisioned by” social policy 
and other such norms).  
124 See supra notes 117-20 and accompanying text. 
125 For an interesting recent account on the realist–formalist divide, see BRIAN Z. 
TAMANAHA, BEYOND THE FORMALIST-REALIST DIVIDE:  THE ROLE OF POLITICS IN JUDGING 
(2010). 
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with property, without having to classify an entitlement as a property 
right for all purposes.  Quasi-property in this conception is seen to 
have such little analytical meaning of its own that it fails to merit iden-
tification as an independent category.  Instead, the view is that quasi-
property is a strategic device invoked for a variety of consequentialist 
reasons, not all of which are the same.  Quasi-property is thus simply a 
product of what it lets courts do with an entitlement, rather than a cate-
gory of entitlements with independent analytical meaning. 
While this objection has some merit, it misapprehends the role 
that I claim for quasi-property as an independent category in the law.  
To begin with, it frames the distinction in excessively binary terms, and 
as such ignores the possibility that a category of entitlements may de-
rive its meaning entirely from its functioning—i.e., the consequences 
that it produces when applied.  The problem that lies at the root of 
the objection arises only when this meaning is thought to embody an 
immanent rationality within the category, independent of its function-
ing—a “mechanical jurisprudence.”126   
Indeed, an objection along these lines has been made against the 
category of property itself within the law.  Alluding to its meaningless-
ness, the noted Scandinavian Legal Realist Alf Ross argued that prop-
erty could well be replaced by the term “tû-tû” and produce the same 
results, if society came to understand the term to produce the same 
consequences as property.127  In a similar vein, Tom Grey advanced the 
argument that the idea of property disintegrated in the law and con-
sequently could no longer remain a “central category” of thought.128  
Despite these claims, property continues to remain a normatively sig-
nificant category in the law, one whose meaning today is thought to 
originate in largely functional terms.  Thus, it doesn’t dilute the coher-
ence of a legal category if the category derives its meaning from the 
consequences that it produces, so long as the set of such consequences 
is finite and can be identified in advance. 
The understanding of quasi-property advanced in this Article 
doesn’t rely simply on formalism.  Rather, it pays clear attention to the 
 
126 Roscoe Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8 COLUM. L. REV. 605, 605-07 (1908) 
(describing the formalist approach as entailing a form of mechanical jurisprudence);  
cf. TAMANAHA, supra note 125, at 28 (arguing that mechanical jurisprudence was a 
trope, not a reality ever believed by any legal scholars or judges). 
127 Alf Ross, Comment, Tû-Tû, 70 HARV. L. REV. 812, 815, 818-19 (1957).   
128 See Grey, supra note 17, at 82 (“The development of a largely capitalist market 
economy toward industrialism . . . must lead to the decline of property as a central cate-
gory of legal and political thought.”). 
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reasons why courts invoke the category and the consequences that flow 
from this choice.  At the same time, my theory posits that there is a 
common analytical—even if not normative—framework underlying 
quasi-property.  I certainly do not advance a mechanistic idea of the 
category, and do not presume that courts must rely on it in some deduc-
tive sense.  Rather, the argument for quasi-property actively embraces 
realism, without allowing quasi-property to abjure all reliance on cate-
gories and concepts in the law altogether.129  Indeed, many of the rea-
sons suggested for the evolution and use of the category derive quite 
legitimately from “policy” considerations that are exogenous to the 
category itself, an idea that is fundamentally at odds with a formalist 
approach to constructing categories and concepts in the law.   
CONCLUSION 
Quasi-property forms a plausible category of interests in the com-
mon law where the law chooses to simulate property’s exclusionary 
framework through a mechanism of relational liability.  While there 
isn’t a consistent pattern of usage for the concept in any one area, one 
can still trace a common structural framework in the areas where 
courts do frequently employ the idea.  What we begin to see in these 
areas is that the idea of quasi-property is employed in situations where 
the law wants to signal limited exclusion, yet at the same time is reluc-
tant to connect the directive to the res itself.  Instead, the law chooses 
the framework of a liability regime to communicate this directive in a 
relational, bilateral manner. 
Ever since the Realist turn in legal thinking, legal concepts and 
categories have come to matter increasingly little to courts, scholars, 
and even students of law.  The idea of “property” is no exception.  In-
deed, the concept today is understood less as a category and more as a 
set of consequences flowing from certain situations.  “Property is what 
property does” has become the dominant way of thinking about the 
idea.  In the process, the concept has come to be stretched and ap-
plied to a host of situations, either directly, by analogy, or as metaphor, 
with the result that Grey’s famous declaration of property’s conceptual 
“collapse” is arguably truer today than it was when originally made.130 
 
129 In fact, the term “realism” itself means several different things.  For a useful 
attempt to reconcile realism and common law conceptualism, see Hanoch Dagan, The 
Craft of Property, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 1517, 1558 (2003), and Hanoch Dagan, The Realist 
Conception of Law, 57 U. TORONTO L.J. 607, 647 (2007). 
130 Grey, supra note 17, at 74. 
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Taking quasi-property seriously as a category and concept in the 
common law is on its own unlikely to go far in stemming this trend.  
All the same, it highlights an important and unappreciated dimension 
to the idea of property in the common law:  an element of introspection, 
so to speak, in the law’s own framing of an interest as a metaphor or 
simulation of the idea of property.  In characterizing certain interests 
as property-like, but not property, the law can be understood as signal-
ing that property as a concept does indeed have some core static con-
tent that it is seeking to mimic through a liability regime.  One hopes 
that the recognition of this core content might provide courts and 
scholars with reason to pause before altogether writing off property as 
a normatively and functionally insignificant category in the law. 
 
